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NOTES
Blind Man's Bluff: An Analysis of the Discovery of
E~pert Witnesses Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4) and a Proposed Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
As litigation has become more complex, the use of expert witnesses to
render authoritative opinions on issues in dispute has increased dramatically.'
Consequently, the rules governing the discovery of expert witnesses have
undergone significant change. The purpose of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposal of litigation by facilitating the formulation of issues in dispute,
preventing unfair surprise at trial, identifying groundless claims and de-
fenses, and encouraging pre-trial settlement. 2 The rules governing discovery
also recognize that effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires
significant preparation; advance knowledge of the expected testimony of an
opposing party's experts is the only acceptable substitute for what would
otherwise be lengthy and fruitless cross-examination at trial.3 These policies
take on special significance in the context of the discovery of expert
witnesses.
Discovery of expert witnesses is governed by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Through sub-divisions (A) and (B), the rule
delineates the circumstances in which counsel may discover information
about the identity and substance of testimony of an adversary's expert
witnesses. 5 A cursory review of the rule indicates that the limitations on
discovery of experts retained or consulted by opposing counsel are clear. A
1. See F. JAmms & G. HAzARD, Corm PROCEDuRE § 6.11, at 202 (2d ed. 1977); Daniels,
Managing Litigation Experts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 64.
2. Comment, Discovery of Expert Information Under the Federal Rules, 10 U. RiCH. L.
REv. 706, 706 (1976). An excellent treatment of the history of Rule 26(b)(4) is found in
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 898-99.
3. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503-04 (1970) [hereinafter Advisory Notes].
4. The text of Rule 26(b)(4) is reproduced infra at note 38.
5. FED. R. Cwr. P. 26(b)(4)(A), (B).
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more probing analysis, however, confirms that the rule leaves unanswered
many vital questions concerning the practicalities of the discovery of experts.
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the history of Rule 26(b)(4), 6 and
Part II discusses the current application of the rule and the rule's inadequacy
regarding practical application, interpretation by the courts, and ex parte
contact between opposing counsel and expert witnesses.7 Finally, Part III
suggests an amendment of Rule 26(b)(4) to correct the rule's current
deficiencies and to provide a more practical process for the discovery of
expert witnesses.8
I. THE HISTORY OF RULE 26(b)(4)
Prior to the proposal of Rule 26(b)(4) in 1966 and its subsequent adoption
as revised in 1970, the Federal Rules placed no limitation on the discovery
of experts other than the requirement of relevance and the restriction arising
from privilege. 9 The lack of explicit guidelines for determining the acceptable
extent of discovery of expert witnesses created a chaotic situation, 10 as
federal trial court practices ranged from allowing a party to depose an
adversary's expert concerning the expert's conclusions to denying disclosure
of even the names of expert witnesses retained by another party." The
classic illustration of the confusion surrounding expert discovery is a case
where, in a patent infringement action involving the plaintiff's experts
residing in Massachusetts and Ohio, the federal district court in Massachu-
setts denied the defendant's motion to compel any discovery of the expert
in Massachusetts, and the federal district court in Ohio granted the defen-
dant's motion to compel full discovery of the expert in Ohio.12
In an attempt to impose order on the chaos of expert discovery, the
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposed an
amendment to the Rules in 1946 that would have banned all pre-trial
discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts. 3 The proposed
6. See infra notes 9-37 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-180 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 181-206 and accompanying text.
9. Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D.
111, 116 (1966) (originally printed in 39 WAsH. L. Rav. 665 (1964)) [hereinafter Long].
10. See Graham, supra note 2, at 899.
11. See Long, supra note 9, at 117.
12. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947);
Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947); see also
C. WRIoH & A. ManR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2029, at 240-41 (1970)
[hereinafter WRiorr & MIaaa]. For a more thorough analysis of the Cold Metal cases, see
Note, Discovery of the Nontestifying Expert Witness' Identity Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: You Can't Tell the Players Without a Program, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 201, 203
n.6 (1985).
13. See Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-70 (1946).
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amendment omitted any reference to discovery of the expert himself and
prohibited a discovering party from obtaining reports or writings prepared
by the expert or counsel unless denial of the production of such documents
would unfairly prejudice the discovering party or cause him undue hardship
or injustice. 14 Congress did not adopt the proposed amendment, however,
and courts were left to resolve the difficulties of expert discovery without
further guidance. 15
The courts that allowed the discovery of experts viewed it as merely
advancing the time of disclosure of information that would eventually be
learned at trial, and believed that the potential unfairness to the party
retaining the expert was outweighed by the opposition's need to discover
the expert's information.' 6 The courts denying discovery relied upon at least
one of three distinct theories: the attorney-client privilege, the work-product
doctrine, and the "unfairness" rule.17 Professor Friedenthal, in his influ-
ential article on the discovery of experts, suggested that the attorney-client
privilege theory be rejected to the extent that facts known by the expert
receive protection from discovery.'" Commentators urged that since facts
known by the client himself were discoverable and could not be shielded
simply by repetition to the client's attorney, the client's knowledge of the
facts was not protected, and, therefore, the expert's factual knowledge
should not be protected. 9 The application of the work-product doctrine
restricting or preventing the discovery of experts was also dismissed on the
basis that the expert is the witness rather than the attorney, and thus the
need to protect the mental impressions of the attorney was not at issue. 20
Exceptions could be made, however, for sensitive materials prepared by the
expert containing strategic suggestions for the litigation.2' Both the attorney-
client privilege theory and work-product doctrine were repudiated as res-
trictions on the discovery of experts by the Advisory Committee in creating
the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). 22
The restrictions on expert discovery based on the principle of unfairness
received more favorable treatment by courts and commentators than did
the attorney-client privilege and work-product limitations.Y The courts had
formulated two theories based on the principle of unfairness. The first
14. Id. at 456-57.
15. Note, supra note 12, at 203 n.6.
16. Id. at 203-04.
17. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
SrA. L. REV. 455 (1962); see also Long, supra note 9, at 123-42.
18. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 455-69.
19. See Note, supra note 12, at 205; see also Graham, supra note 2, at 901.
20. Graham, supra note 2, at 901.
21. See Note, supra note 12, at 205 n.20.
22. See Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504-05; Graham, supra note 2, at 902.
23. See Graham, supra note 2, at 902.
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theory recognized that the expert information involved in the litigation could
be protected by a property right in the information, although courts were
divided on the issues of whether it was necessary to compensate the expert
for his developed expertise and whether such protection extended to facts
known by the expert 4 Friedenthal dismissed this first theory as "hardly a
substantial basis for prohibiting disclosure" because the court has the power
to compel any person having knowledge of relevant facts to disclose them
during discovery or at trial. 25
The second theory was based on the policy of discouraging laziness by
opposing counsel and prohibited counsel from using the information ob-
tained through the discovery of an expert retained and groomed for trial
by an adversary to prepare his own case.26 This second theory focused on
the need to distinguish between the purposes for which the discovery was
sought, as opposing counsel might be attempting either to build his own
case, reveal new avenues for the discovery of potentially important infor-
mation, or prepare for cross-examination of the expert witness. 2 The
problem with this approach is that it is "impossible to divorce information
for purposes of impeachment from information to be used in direct support
of the discoverer's own case," and, therefore, the court would have to
decide whether the need for preparation for cross-examination outweighed
the unfairness to the retaining party.21
In order to eliminate or mitigate the unfairness created by this approach
to discovery, Friedenthal proposed the principle of "mutuality. ' 29 Frieden-
thal suggested that discovery of the expert should be permitted absent a
showing of good cause only as to experts expected to testify and that both
parties be required to decide upon their experts prior to discovery. 30 These
24. Id.; see also, e.g., Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass.
1941); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
25. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 482.
26. See Graham, supra note 2, at 903. Parties should be dissuaded from playing a waiting
game in the retention and preparation of expert witnesses since this practice could lead to
unnecessary delay in bringing the case to trial and would prejudice the diligent party in the
litigation. See Note, supra note 12, at 209-10 n.46.
27. Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 483.
28. Id. at 487; see also WRIuo & MiLLER, supra note 12, at 247.
29. Graham, supra note 2, at 904. Friedenthal asserted that "[t]he most satisfactory way
to solve the problems of discovery in this area" was the free exchange of all relevant expert
information, and that a party seeking discovery of the expert of another party should first be
required to provide a list of his expert witnesses by which he would be bound at trial. The
trial court would be allowed to deny discovery upon a finding that the party has not made a
reasonable effort to obtain expert information of his own. The court could then insist on a
list of previously consulted experts before allowing discovery by the requesting party; this will
prevent prejudicing the party who had prepared diligently. Friedentha, supra note 17, at 488.
Listing the experts prior to discovery of the adversary's experts would eliminate the dangers
posed by "advocate experts" retained to differ with an adversary's experts once those latter
experts' theories were revealed, and such a listing would also prevent the prejudice created by
an adversary's attempt to subvert preparation by opposing counsel by withholding a surprise
expert witness until just before trial. See id. at 485, 487.
30. See Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 487.
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procedures would further the general policy of independent preparation if
combined with "timing" considerations providing for the exchange of the
names of these experts shortly before trial.31
The final significant development prior to the creation of Rule 26(b)(4)
in 1970 was Judge Roszel Thomsen's decision and opinion in Knighton v.
Villian & Fassio in 1965.32 In Knighton, the court formulated a rule on the
discovery of experts through which a party could require any other party
to identify witnesses that he expected to call as an expert at trial and to
disclose the subject matter of the expert's proposed testimony by submission
of an interrogatory to such party a reasonable time before trial.33 This rule
agreed with Friedenthal and Long to the extent that it rejected the limitations
on expert discovery based on the attorney-client privilege and work-product
theories. 34 The rule contrasted sharply with the commentators' suggestions
for full discovery limited only by fairness considerations, however, by
limiting the scope of the permissible discovery of experts to the experts'
opinions and the facts and reasons upon which those opinions were based.35
The Knighton decision did incorporate, to a limited degree, the "two-step"
process suggested by Friedenthal providing for an initial listing of experts
followed by further discovery if warranted, but ignored the mutuality and
timing concerns stressed by the commentators. 36 These facets of the Knighton
decision take on special significance in light of the fact that the text of
Rule 26(b)(4) eventually adopted in 1970 bears greater similarity to the
policies outlined in the Knighton decision than to the suggestions of the
commentators. 37 The impact of the Advisory Committee's reliance on the
Knighton rule is the subject of the next portion of this Note.
II. THI PRESENT STRUCTURE OF RuLE 26(b)(4) AND PROBLEMS
THEREIN
A. Current Interpretations of the Rule
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the
exclusive means of discovering facts known and opinions held by experts if
31. Id. at 487-88; see also Graham, supra note 2, at 904-05. Jeremiah Long also identified
timing problems, with his primary concern being the tendency of a party to find an accomo-
dating expert if permitted to discover the adversary's expert before retaining one of his own.
Long feared that this practice could lead, intentionally or otherwise, to the manufacturing of
contrary evidence. Long, supra note 9, at 125.
32. 39 F.R.D. 11 (1. Md. 1965). In this case, the defendant objected to the service of
several interrogatories by plaintiff's counsel in a personal injury action, one of which sought
the disclosure of the identity and specialty of each expert defendant planned to call at trial
and requested any written reports prepared by the experts be attached to the answers to the
interrogatories. Graham, supra note 2, at 906.
33. Knighton, 39 F.R.D. at 13. Chief Judge Roszel Thomsen subsequently served on the
Advisory Committee which adopted Rule 26(b)(4).
34. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
35. See Graham, supra note 2, at 907.
36. Id. at 907-08.
37. Id. at 909.
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those facts or opinions were acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation.3" Prior to the creation and adoption of Rule 26(b)(4) in 1970, the
critical issue concerning the scope of expert discovery was whether discovery
of the expert would be restricted to the expert's direct testimony and the
factual basis of such testimony. 9 The Rule essentially adopted the position
advocated by Friedenthal and Long4° by not placing substantive limitations
on the scope of the discovery of experts other than the requirement that
discoverable facts and opinions be prepared "in anticipation of litigation." '4'
As a substantive limitation, the "in anticipation of litigation" requirement
involves more than the consultation of an expert after the filing of a suit.
The information in question must have been prepared in response to, or in
furtherance of, a specific suit; information prepared or obtained with the
mere contingency of litigation is not within the protection of the Rule. 42 As
38. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4) provides:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial,
to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court
may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to
scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, con-
cerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial,
only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule;
and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this
rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdi-
vision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery
to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
39. Day & Dixon, A Judicial Perspective on Expert Discovery Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4):
An Empirical Study of Trial Court Judges and a Proposed Amendment, 20 J. MARHALL L.
Rnv. 377, 387 (1987).
40. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
41. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 387-88.
42. See Note, supra note 2, at 710-11. In Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna
Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. I11. 1972), the court rejected a broad definition of "in
anticipation of litigation" which would have allowed reports prepared by an expert after a
claim had arisen and litigation was a contingency to be protected from discovery. The court
noted that the party claiming protection of Rule 26(b)(4) had not yet consulted counsel and
that there was a substantial time lag between the preparation of the reports and the eventual
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a result, limitations on the discovery of experts are imposed by procedural
mechanisms, and although the primary concern of the Rule is the method
by which discovery may be accomplished, the procedural limitations also
have a significant impact on the substantive development of a party's case.43
The accepted approach for analyzing the procedural limitations of Rule
26(b)(4) divides experts into four separate classes:
1) Experts a party expects to call at trial;
2) Experts retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial but not expected to testify at trial;
3) Experts informally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained;
4) Experts whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial.-
Each class of experts receives distinct treatment under the Rule, and the
following paragraphs will detail the limitations of discovery of the expert
according to his class in the order presented above.
1. Experts expected to testify.
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) provides for limited discovery of the facts known and
opinions held by experts who are expected to testify at trial and is intended
to facilitate cross-examination and rebuttal at trial.41 Rule 26(b)(4)(A) es-
filing of the suit. The court feared that such an interpretation would immunize from discovery
any documents prepared in the ordinary course of business relating to potential claims and
leave the party seeking discovery with severely limited access to necessary information. Id.
Courts have resorted to various other tests. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) ("a possibility") (cited in Wilson, Rules Pertaining to Discoverability
of Expert Opinion Evidence in Federal Court, 1983 Tam.L LAW. GrmE 411, 420-21 (1983));
Securities & Exchange Comm. v. World-Wide Coin Investors, 92 F.R.D. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
("a substantial probability"); In re Sinking of Barge "Ranger I", 92 F.R.D. 486 (S.D. Texas
1981) ("a prospect"). Wilson suggests that a two-factor test considering whether litigation is
a contingency and the motive of the investigation be used to resolve the issue of what is "in
anticipation of litigation." Id. Day & Dixon argue, however, that the anticipation of litigation
limitation is illusory and ultimately meaningless since the relevance standard of Rule 26(b)(1)
governing general discovery would apply; because the relevance standard is very broad regarding
what constitutes "in anticipation of litigation," the Rule only superficially imposes substantive
restrictions. Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 388 n.81. It is apparent that what is considered
to be "in anticipation of litigation" in any given case will depend on the individual facts of
the case and the particular jurisdiction.
43. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 388. Notably missing from the procedural
constraints to be discussed in the following paragraphs are the mutuality and timing concerns
of the commentators. There is nothing in the text of the Rule or the accompanying advisory
committee notes which requires mutuality in the expert discovery process. The provisions of
the Rule do not condition a party's discovery of an adversary's expert on an ability or
willingness to engage in reciprocal discovery, and there is no prioritization or race aspect to
the process under the current Rule. The timing considerations urged to ensure each party
prepared his own case prior to discovering facts and opinions from his adversary's expert were
similarly not adopted in the Rule, and there are no significant timing constraints on parties
in conducting discovery of the experts. Id. at 388-89.
44. See supra note 38; see also Wgior & MIniE, supra note 12, at 250.
45. See supra note 38.
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tablishes a two-step method for the discovery of experts expected to testify
at trial. The first step allows the discovering party to obtain, without court
intervention, the identity of any expert witness his adversary expects to call
at trial, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to
testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion through interroga-
tories. 46 The phrase "expected to testify" was chosen over the term "may
call" in order to ensure adequate preparation for cross-examination by
making an adversary's expert's facts, opinions, and reasons for those
opinions available to each party a reasonable time before trial.47 The second
step provides that discovery beyond interrogatories can only be obtained
through motion to the court, and such further discovery is at the discretion
of the court.
48
Because Rule 26(b)(4)(A) relies on the use of inter- rogatorieS to discover
the information necessary to facilitate cross-examination and rebuttal of the
expert at trial, the strengths and weaknesses of interrogatories as a discovery
method take on great significance. 49 Generally, the interrogatory's principal
advantage is the saving of time and money; retaining counsel can answer
the interrogatories with information he would have already obtained from
his expert to prepare his own case for trial, and this process requires no
significant extra time or expense on the part of the expert or the party
retaining the expert. 50 The interrogatory was selected as the initial discovery
device over the superior deposition process51 in an attempt to reconcile the
countervailing policies of the need to prepare for cross-examination and the
46. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
47. Judge Thomsen, in Knighton v. Villian & Fassio, 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md. 1965), indicated
that the phrase "expected to call" was preferred to the term "may call" because the latter
term was simply too broad. Judge Thomsen acknowledged that the former phrase could alsd
be subject to broad interpretation, but determined that the "expected to call" standard achieves
the purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) by making these facts, opinions and bases for the opinions
available to opposing counsel. Id. at 13; see also Hoover v. United States Dept. of the Interior,
611 F.2d 1132, 1141 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980); WRIt & MILLER, supra note 12, at 251-52.
48. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
49. See Graham, supra note 2, at 917.
50. See WRIor & MIR, supra note 12, at 252. It is important to note, however, that
some federal district courts require greater disclosure under local rules and compel the disclosure
of an expert's reports. Connors, A New Look at an Old Cbncern-Protecting Expert Infor-
mation from Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 18 DuQ. L. REV . 271, 272-73 (1980).
51. Interrogatories are typically useful for discovering tht details of general pleading
allegations, simple facts, admissions, and uncovering other potentially discoverable facts and
theories. Depositions are superior to interrogatories for conducting a thorough inquiry into an
adversary's case. Depositions allow the examining party greater flexibility since the examining
party can refer to the expert's answers to previous questions and deprive the expert of the
opportunity to fully consult with counsel before respondirig to a question. See Graham, suprd
note 2, at 917-18. A deposition may also reveal to the examining party vulierabilities in the
expert's demeanor and substantive presentation of facts and opinions that would not be
disclosed by an interrogatory.
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need to protect the retaining party from the unfairness of allowing the
discovering party to build his case from the information discovered. 52 The
policy conflict was resolved in favor of preventing unfairness, and, conse-
quently, Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)'s "interrogatory first" approach to expert dis-
covery has been described as "an uncomfortable modification and
overreaching of the normal function of interrogatories. 5 3
Once a discovering party has learned the identity and substance of
testimony of an adversary's expected trial experts through interrogatories,
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) allows a party to seek further discovery through motion
to the court. This provision gives the trial court discretion to grant further
discovery typically based on the insufficiency of the answers to the inter-
rogatory and allows the court to limit further discovery in timing and scope
to prevent abuse of the process. 54
This provision, however, fails to establish a standard to guide the trial
court's determination of when interrogatory answers are insufficient or
further discovery is otherwise warranted, and reported cases indicate that
trial courts are having difficulty applying the two-step procedure established
by the Rule. 55 This difficulty is a direct result of the Advisory Committee's
inability to resolve the issue of whether testifying experts should be treated
exactly as any other witness at trial, and the existence of a disagreement in
the Committee is substantiated by the lack of a standard guiding the trial
court in the use of its discretion.5 6 As a result, commentators have remarked
that further discovery is granted on the whim or personal predilection of
the trial judge rather than the policy of allowing pre-trial preparation by
the parties. 57
2. Experts not expected to testify.
The discovery of experts retained or specially employed in anticipation
of litigation but not expected to be called to testify at trial is governed by
Rule 26(b)(4)(B). This provision precludes the discovery of facts known and
opinions held by non-testifying experts except under exceptional circum-
stances demonstrated by the party seeking discovery. The distinction between
experts retained but not expected to testify and those expected to be called
52. See Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504.
53. See Graham, supra note 2, at 917-18. The problems created by this modification are
discussed more thoroughly infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
54. See Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) seeks to further reduce the
danger of unfairness to the retaining party by requiring the discovering party to pay fees and
expenses in certain cases. See supra note 38 for text.
55. See Graham, supra note 2, at 918-931.
56. Id. at 921-22.
57. See Connors, supra note 50, at 272; Graham, supra note 2, at 930; Wilson, supra note
42, at 432.
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at trial reflects the notion that discovery of the information possessed by
the expert to testify at trial is inevitable.5 8
The exceptional circumstances standard is designed to minimize the danger
that a retaining party may not be as protective of an expert whose infor-
mation is not indispensable if that information may readily be discovered
by his adversary. 9 By requiring a discovering party to show exceptional
circum- stances for the disclosure of the facts and opinions of a non-
testifying expert, 26(b)(4)(B) protects the retaining counsel's right to decide
which of several retained experts to put on the witness stand based on the
expert's clarity of presentation, ability to withstand cross-examination, or
other strategic concerns without fear that the non-testifying expert's infor-
mation will get into the "wrong hands." Because the expert will not be
testifying at trial, the policy favoring discovery for preparation for adequate
cross-examination vanishes and the policy of protecting the retaining party
from the unfairness of disclosing developed information takes on greater
significance.
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not establish an explicit standard to determine
whether exceptional circumstances exist for the court to permit discovery
of the non-testifying expert, and the Advisory Committee's Notes to the
Rule provide little guidance. The Notes state only that it must be "imprac-
ticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means.'"'6 Because a litigant will not know either the
facts known or opinions held by an adversary's expert, one court has held
that it will rarely be possible for the party seeking discovery to show that
exceptional circumstances exist for obtaining those facts and opinions. 61
However, some commentators assert that this result was specifically intended
in the creation of this provision of the Rule.6 2
This deliberate ambiguity has been clarified by courts and commentators
indentifying situations in which the exceptional circumstances test is met.
The first requirement for demonstrating exceptional circumstances is that
58. See Wmorrr & MILLER, supra note 12, at 254.
59. Id.
60. Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504. One commentator noted that Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
"expressly places the burden of showing exceptional circumstances on the party seeking
discovery," and that "[c]ourts have consistently adhered to the rule of placing the burden on
the discovering party." Comment, Protecting the Non-Testimonial Expert, 33 S.D.L. REv.
303, 306 (1988); see also Willett v. General Electric Co., 113 N.H. 358, 306 A.2d 789 (1973)
(discovering party claiming exceptional circumstances based on a change in the condition of
the inspected item must establish, through discovery or other sources, that the condition of
the item has changed substantially). But see Roesburg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (discovering party held to have satisfied exceptional circumstances test where
party opposing discovery failed to suggest a practical alternative method by which the
discovering party could obtain the information).
61. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) (relying on the text of proposed
Rule 26(b)(4)).
62. See WsuoHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 256.
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the information sought must be material to the cause of action, based on
the logic that the information must be necessary to prove a party's case
before the need for the information can be described as "exceptional. ' 63
In addition, recent cases indicate a party must be able to substantiate that
the information sought through discovery of his adversary's expert is not
available from other sources.64 The most conclusive showings of exceptional
circumstances occurred where the circumstances changed so significantly
that the discovering party has been afforded no reasonable opportunity to
obtain the requested information on his own,6 or where the independent
acquisition or development of the information would require excessive time,
delay and expense. 66 While some courts found exceptional circumstances in
63. See Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974); Comment,
Protecting the Non-Testimonial Expert, supra note 60, at 305. Note, however, that the Crockett
court over-extended the materiality requirement by insisting on a showing of "substantial
need," the standard prescribed in Rule 26 (b)(3) but not contained in Rule 26(b)(4). Crockett,
61 F.R.D. at 320.
64. The court in Marine Petroleum v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.
1980), in denying discovery, focused on the fact that the plaintiff claiming exceptional
circumstances to discover the requested information from the defendant's expert had ample
opportunity to obtain the same information through discovery of the defendant himself. The
court noted that the plaintiff, once receiving the information from the defendant, could hire
an expert to make an independent analysis. Id. at 994. Similarly, in United States v. Hooker
Chemicals, 112 F.R.D. 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), the court refused to permit the United States
to obtain the report of the defendant corporation's non-testifying expert because the United
States had either retained or consulted nine other experts regarding the subject matter of the
defendant's expert's report. See also Grindell v. Am. Motors Corp., 108 F.R.D. 94 (W.D.N.Y.
1985) (exceptional circumstances not present where the information was discoverable from the
retaining party); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc. 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975) (discovery not
allowed regarding adversary's expert's analysis of audit reports and such reports had already
been disclosed to the discovering party). These rulings also recognize aspects of the unfairness
doctrine by prohibiting the discovering party from building his case from the conscientious
preparaton of his adversary. See supra text accompanying note 52; Peilemeier, Discovery of
Non-Testifying "In-House" Experts Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 58 IND. L.J.
597, 607 (1983).
65. In Dixon v. Cappellini, 88 F.R.D. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1980), the plaintiff alleged a civil rights
violation and claimed extreme fright and nervous shock resulting from false arrest, imprison-
ment, and threats of force while in the defendants' custody in late 1978. Plaintiff's counsel
resisted the defendants' discovery of psychiatric reports regarding the plaintiff's mental state
prepared by plaintiff's experts in January, 1979. The court held that because the plaintiff put
her mental state in issue, the defendants demonstrated exceptional circumstances since inde-
pendent investigation more than a year after the incident would not contain equivalent
information on plaintiff's mental state and the reports were unobtainable by other means. Id.
at 3-4. In Delcastor, Inc. v. Vail Associates, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 405 (D. Col. 1985), the plaintiff
sought to compel the full report of the defendant's expert engineer on the condition and cause
of the mudslide in dispute in the litigation. The defendant's expert was the only qualified
expert able to examine the site before unseasonably warm temperatures and human activity
"drastically altered" site conditions. Id. at 408-09. The court held that "an expert's opinion
based on a summary of another expert's observation of a condition is not equivalent to an
expert's opinion based on his own observations" and compelled production of the full report.
Id.
66. The leading case finding prohibitive time and expense as satisfying the exceptional
1989]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
less compelling situations,6 7 the "changed circumstances" and "prohibitive
cost or delay" rationales for finding exceptional circumstances fit more
squarely with the purposes of Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
Whether a party is entitled to discover the name or identity of an
adversary's non-testifying expert is an issue that remains in debate. Rule
26(b)(4)(B) makes no mention of the discoverability of the non-testifying
expert's identity, and the only indication of a proposed standard in the
Advisory Committee Notes states that a party may, "on a proper showing,"
require the other party to name experts retained or specially employed as
an ancillary procedure. 68 Courts required to interpret the non-treatment of
this aspect of the Rule have been split on the appropriate standard for the
discovery of the identity of the expert, 69 and this lack of a stipulated
standard has created confusion among federal courts and practitioners and
caused complications arising in the context of ex parte contact between
opposing counsel and the expert of an adversary. 70
3. The informally consulted expert.
Rule 26(b)(4) contains no provision for the discovery of an expert who
was informally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained or specially
employed by the consulting party. 26(b)(4)(B) only applies to experts retained
or specially employed, and this subdivision precludes discovery of even the
identity of any experts who were informally consulted but not retained. 71
circumstances test, Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.
Tex.), involved an anti-trust action in which the defendant attempted to obtain through
discovery the documentation of the code and contents of computer programs created by
plaintiff's experts as part of a complicated computerized beer marketing distribution model.
The defendant contended that its own expert would be unable to properly understand otherwise
undefined short-hand codes or symbols comprising the computer program except with the
inordinate expense of time, money, and resources. Id. at 1138. The court, in granting discovery
of the code explanations only, noted that the defendant was not seeking to avoid the expense
of retaining his own expert or building his case from his adversary's expert but merely
expediting discovery of the means and methods through which the plaintiff's expert would
substantiate his conclusions at trial. Id. at 1138-39; see also In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, 105 F.R.D. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
67. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 384-85; Comment, supra note 60, at 312-18.
68. Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504.
69. See Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496
(10th Cir. 1980) and Baki v. B.F. Diamond Const. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976) as
representative cases.
70. These problems will be thoroughly discussed in Part IIB. See infra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text.
71. See Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504; see also Wiuorr & MMIsER, supra note 12,
at 257. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not provide specifically for the discovery of an individual
employee of a party to the case who is specially assigned by the employer/party to investigate,
analyze or otherwise form an opinion about the issues in dispute in the litigation. The
parameters of discovery of these "in-house" experts is beyond the scope of this Note; however,
an analysis and proposals for resolving the problems created by the lack of an articulated
standard for such discovery can be found in Peilemeier, supra note 64, and Comment, The
In-House Expert Witness: Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 S.D.L.
REv. 283 (1988).
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The distinction between an informally consulted expert and one retained is
not always clear. Professor Graham suggests that the drafters of 26(b)(4)(B)
contemplated a distinction between an expert who advises a party based
upon a review of the relevant facts and whose information or opinion is
not likely to significantly assist the consulting party in the preparation of
the case and one whose opinions are determined to be helpful to the
consulting party.72 The possibility of subsequent discovery of the ineffective
expert by an adversary would discourage parties from initiating a search
for experts because the expert's adverse information would be immediately
available to an opponent; if the expert was of assistance to the consulting
party, however, the expert would probably be retained by the party and
fall under the protection of 26(b)(4)(B).73 Graham has therefore suggested
that this provision be read to consider any expert who satisfies the excep-
tional circumstances test a retained expert subject to discovery regardless of
the formality of contact, thereby neither discouraging a party from searching
for expert witnesses nor preventing an adversary from discovering infor-
mation from an expert not helpful to the consulting party where such
information is otherwise not obtainable.7 4
4. Experts whose information was not developed in preparation
for trial.
The provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) do not address the expert whose infor-
mation was not acquired in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial. The rule offers no protection for the expert who was an actor or
viewer with respect to transactions or occurences constituting the subject
matter of the litigation and such experts are to be treated as ordinary
witnesses whose facts and opinions may be discovered through routine
discovery practice.75 One commentator has argued that the ordinary witness
doctrine is inconsistent with the policies underlying Rule 26(b)(4)(B) when
72. Graham, supra note 2, at 939. Graham further asserts that an expert consulted
informally but of assistance to the consulting party be considered a retained expert for the
purposes of Rule 26(b)(4)(B). In the event an informally consulted expert becomes the only
expert with knowledge of certain facts, that expert should be subject to discovery under the
exceptional circumstances standard of 26(b)(4)(B). Id. at 939-40.
73. Id. at 940.
74. Id. Note, however, that one court has not accepted the proposition that Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
prohibits any discovery of informally consulted experts, and held instead that a party might
be entitled to some discovery of the informally consulted expert if there were some reason to
believe the discovery would be of assistance to the party seeking discovery. Nemetz v. Aye,
63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974). For a more detailed discussion of the import of this case and
related cases, see Wilson, supra note 42, at 423-25.
75. Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 503.
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applied to the pre-retention knowledge of the expert witness, 76 but the Rule
continues to operate as written and is interpreted to provide no protection
to an expert who is a regular employee of the retaining party and not
specially employed in preparation for trial.77
B. Problems Presented by the Current Interpretation of Rule
26(b)(4).
Rule 26(b)(4) was originally designed to resolve many of the difficulties
faced by federal trial courts concerning the discovery of expert witnesses.
The Advisory Committee succeeded in articulating a rule which acknowl-
edged the relevant policies and other theoretical concerns regarding expert
discovery, but the adopted rule has generated a myriad of problems in
practical and interpretive application. The response to the Rule's compli-
cations ranges from a division among the courts to a rejection of the
provisions of the Rule by the practicing bar. The purpose of this portion
of the Note is to identify and explain the Rule's inadequacy to govern
expert discovery in its present form.
1. Discovery orders are not immediately appealable.
Rule 26(b)(4) grants the trial court discretion in applying the provisions
of the rule governing expert discovery, 7 and as a result, most discovery
orders are not reviewed by appellate courts.1 9 A discovery order is considered
an interlocutory order rather than a final order, and under the provisions
of the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, discovery orders are not regarded
as presenting a controlling question of law or justifying immediate appeal
because these orders do not materially advance the termination of the
litigation.80 Accordingly, appellate courts will reverse a discovery order only
76. See Day, The Ordinary Witness Doctrine: Discovery of the Pre-Retention Knowledge
of a Nonwitness Expert Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 38 ARK. L. REv. 763 (1985). This
article is an extensive and authoritative discussion of the ordinary witness doctrine under Rule
26(b)(4), a subject outside the scope of this Note.
77. See WuGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 258. For an excellent treatment of the
problems created when an expert plays more than one role in terms of the four categories
governing discovery, see Note, supra note 2, at 718-19.
78. See supra note 38.
79. Note, A Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(b)(4)(B): The Expert Twice Retained, 12 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 533, 544 (1979).
80. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1958); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 29-31.
Wright and Miller further state that review under this statute should rarely be allowed, and
state that writs of mandamus also are rarely available as a means for review of discovery
orders. Review through the writ of mandamus is reserved for "really extraordinary cases."
Id. Wright and Miller do note, however, that the federal attitude toward mandamus review is
loosening and this liberalized attitude will affect discovery orders. Id.
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for "action which is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable,"', and
parties usually resolve discovery disputes informally rather than resorting to
the formal appeal process8
Discovery orders are appealable as a final order after judgment, but the
issue raised by the discovery order is usually moot by this stage of the
proceeding. 3 The limited opportunity to appeal discovery orders has resulted
in a scarcity of appellate opinions interpreting the provisions of Rule
26(b)(4), and since trial courts rarely have the opportunity to consider the
sophisticated policy arguments supporting changes in the interpretation of
the Rule, the Rule continues to confuse federal courts and practitioners.8 4
2. The Rule fails to standardize further discovery of the testifying
expert.
The absence of a standard in Rule 26(b)(4) for determining when further
discovery is warranted under 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) s5 has led to divergent results
both in courts and in practice. Courts have had difficulty balancing the
policies of adequate preparation for cross-examination and apparent com-
pliance with the provisions of the Rule.16 Some courts have allowed prac-
tically unlimited discovery of expert information and required the discovering
party only to agree to compensate the expert or negotiate with the retaining
party as to splitting the expert's fee in order to obtain further discovery,
while other courts have insisted on a more strict application of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii). 87
81. Marine Petroleum, 641 F.2d at 991.
82. Note, Discovery of Retained Nontestifying Experts' Identities Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 80 Mica. L. Rnv. 513, 514-15 n.9 (1982).
83. See Note, supra note 79, at 544.
84. See id.
85. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
86. In Lanza v. British European Airways, Ltd., MDL Docket No. 147 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
17, 1976), the court held that the plaintiff's responses to defendant's interrogatories regarding
the substance of the testimony of plaintiff's expected experts were sufficient despite the fact
the responses indicated only that the experts would testify as to the design and testing of the
aircraft involved in the litigation. The summary of grounds for the experts' opinions was one
short paragraph giving only general indications of the basis for their opinions, yet the court
similarly held the response was adequate. While the responses perhaps satisfied the provisions
of the Rule, they were not sufficient to allow for adequate cross-examination. See Graham,
supra note 2, at 918-19. In Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ohio
1971), the plaintiffs refused to state more than that the experts would testify concerning the
machine design, electrical circuitry, and human factors engineering, and when required by the
court to supplement such a response, the plaintiffs disclosed one further sentence as to the
expected substance of the experts' testimony. Once again, the court accepted this superficial
compliance with the Rule despite the discovering party's need for information in order to
adequately prepare for cross-examination. See Graham, supra note 2, at 919-21.
87. See Connors, supra note 50, at 273-74.
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The liberal approach to additional discovery is illustrated by Herbst v.
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.8 In Herbst, the court noted
that there was no established standard for further discovery in the Rule or
Advisory Notes and granted the defendant's motion for a deposition based
on the principle that because discovery of non-expert witnesses was liberal,
the discovery of experts should be similarly liberal once the unfairness of
allowing the discovering party to benefit from the other party's expert was
overcome. 9 The Herbst court therefore allowed unlimited discovery of the
retaining party's trial expert subject only to payment for the privilege. In
Wilson v. Resnick,90 however, the court considered interrogatories the only
means of obtaining initial discovery of the facts known and opinions held
by experts under 26(b)(4), and since the plaintiff's responses to the inter-
rogatories were sufficient, further discovery was not allowed by the court. 9'
One commentator suggests that the requirement of 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is mean-
ingless unless courts allow further discovery once a party completes the
mechanical step of interrogatories because a prohibition of further discovery
based on good faith but superficial responses by the retaining party would
interfere with the discovering party's ability to prepare for cross-examina-
tion. 92 He argues that an interpretation of this provision which hinges on
the sufficiency of interrogatory responses merely reformulates the problem
by allowing liberal courts to declare the responses inadequate and conser-
vative courts to declare the responses sufficient. 93
The impact of these divergent approaches on the appropriate standard
for further discovery under 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is mitigated by the fact that the
two-step process created by the Rule is virtually being ignored in practice.
Three separate empirical studies have concluded that the actual practice of
the discovery of experts to be called at trial differs significantly from the
procedure envisioned by the drafters of the Rule.4 A survey conducted by
Professor Graham disclosed that the discovering party deposed his adver-
88. 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975).
89. See Graham, supra note 2, at 924. The court resolved the unfairness aspect of further
discovery by permitting the parties to arrange for a division of the expert's fees. Id.
90. 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
91. See Graham, supra note 2, at 925.
92. Id. at 929.
93. Id. at 929-30.
94. See Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Part Two, an Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169; see also
Day, Expert Discovery Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4): An Empirical Study in South Dakota, 31
S.D.L. REv. 40 (1985); Day & Dixon, supra note 39. It is also notable that the Arizona State
Bar Association Committee, in adopting in 1970 expert discovery provisions identical to the
Federal Rule (Ariz. R.C.P. 26(b)(4)), stated that the motion for further discovery would be
perfunctory and automatically granted in all but the most exceptional circumstances. The Bar
Association noted that the provision was included solely to maintain uniformity between state
and federal rules and that experts would be subject to depositions exactly as if they were
ordinary witnesses. See Wuoirr & MLER, supra note 12, at 253 n.76.
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sary's expert without resort to the two-step process of obtaining court
approval in 60% of the cases and that either the expert's report was
furnished by the adversary, or the expert was deposed by the discovering
party, or both, in 84% of the cases. 95 The survey further indicated that the
custom in practice regarding extensive discovery of expected trial experts
was to proceed voluntarily without resort to judicial compulsion at all.9
The empirical studies conducted by Professor Day essentially mirrored
the work done by Professor Graham in both technique and response.Y
Day's research also indicated that the limitations of 26(b)(4)(A) were rejected
in practice in favor of informal agreements between the parties, with
stipulations being the primary vehicle of expert discovery under the Rule.98
Practitioners requested an adversary's expert's report in over 65% of the
cases and deposed the adversary's expert in over 70% of the cases without
judicial intervention, and the judges responding to the survey confirmed
that discovery occurred in their courts without resort to the court. 99 Both
the practitioners and judges agreed that disregarding the provisions of the
Rule provided for adequate trial preparation.'00
The justification offered for side-stepping the limitations of the Rule's
two-step procedure was the inherent inadequacy of the interrogatory as a
method of providing adequate preparation for cross-examination and re-
buttal,' 0 1 Professors Graham and Day each reported that over 80% of the
respondents in their respective surveys considered the interrogatory wholly
inadequate, as practitioners expressed a need for more than "form respon-
95. See Graham, supra note 94, at 176. Graham prepared a questionnaire designed to
determine whether discovery proceeded beyond the answer to interrogatories voluntarily or
under court supervision and mailed the questionnaire to each federal district judge, United
States magistrate, United States Attorneys' office, the regional offices of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, and to ten practicing
attorneys in each state based on the attorneys' participation in federal court practice. Graham
received 222 tabulable responses consisting of 48 district judges, 23 magistrates, 12 governmental
agencies and 139 practitioners. Id. at 171-72.
96. Id. at 177.
97. See Day, supra note 94; Day & Dixon, supra note 39. Like the Graham survey,
Graham, supra note 94, Day's surveys were designed to determine to what extent the practices
in South Dakota diverged in procedure and substance from the provisions of the Rule. South
Dakota's expert discovery rule (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Am. § 15-6-26(b)(4) (1982)) is modeled
on and worded substantially the same as the federal rule, and the survey assumed that the
state practices would be consistent with the federal rule. A survey was sent to each active
member of the South Dakota Bar, and responding practitioners reported no significant
differences between state and federal practice in this area. Day, supra note 94, at 40-41. The
substantially same survey was sent to South Dakota trial court judges to measure the degree
of consistency between what the practitioners reported and what the judges observed from the
bench. Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 378.
98. See Day, supra note 94, at 49-50.
99. Id. at 50.
100. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 394.
101. See Graham, supra note 94, at 172-74; see also Day, supra note 94, at 51-52; Day &
Dixon, supra note 39, at 394.
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ses" to interrogatories to properly prepare for trial.? 2 Practitioners com-
plained that interrogatory answers were sparse and incomplete, represented
answers opposing counsel would like the expert to give, were not detailed
enough to prevent surprise, and failed to disclose information important to
unmask bias, hostility, or previous testimony.10 3
In addition, the survey results show that commentators' well-intentioned
concerns that full discovery would result in unfairness by allowing the
discovering party to build his case from information obtained through the
discovery of his adversary's expert were unfounded. Over 80% of those
responding to Professor Graham's survey disclosed that the customary
practice of ignoring the two-step requirements of the Rule did not prejudice
either party involved and that a litigant was required to prepare his own
case regardless of his discovery of an adversary's expert.1 4 The two-step
procedure created by the Rule for the discovery of testifying experts is
simply unnecessary.
3. The exceptional circumstances requirement for discovery of
non-testifying experts is often not enforced in practice.
Despite Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s clear prohibition of the discovery of non-
testifying experts absent exceptional circumstances, the empirical studies
indicate that practitioners have, to some degree, decided to ignore the
provisions of the Rule. 0 5 Professor Graham revealed that the reports of
non-testifying experts are often furnished to the opposition and depositions
of experts are voluntarily permitted by the retaining party."1 6 More striking
results were obtained in Professor Day's study, which concluded that
adversaries required the discovering party to meet the exceptional circum-
stances test in only 13% of the cases.1 °
102. See Graham, supra note 94, at 173; see also Day, supra note 94, at 51. It is also
conceivable that an adversary could respond with pat answers designed to satisfy the adequacy
requirement of the court in an effort to require the opposing party to depose the expert and
thus force the opposition to share in the costs incurred by the retaining party in finding and
grooming the expert. Such an adversary would, however, be flirting with the imposition of
sanctions under Federal Rule 37 for abuse of discovery and would also have to sacrifice the
further discovery of his expert with no guarantee the court would require contribution by the
deposing party under 26(b)(4)(C).
103. Graham, supra note 94, at 174.
104. Id. at 181. Graham did note, however, that an attorney may forgo deposing the
adversary's expert for fear of further educating the expert regarding the trial strategy of the
attorney and hinting at propsective cross-examination of the expert or other tactical reasons.
Id. at 186.
105. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
106. See Graham, supra note 94, at 193-94.
107. See Day, supra note 94, at 53. Where the "exceptional circumstances" test was not
required the standard typically was only "relevance." Id.
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These practices disclose a substantial discrepancy between the procedure
contemplated by the Rule and actual practice. The provisions of the Rule
were designed to effect a compromise between the competing policies of
full disclosure of pre-trial information and the danger that the information
of a consulted expert whose opinions were of little or no assistance would
become available to an opponent. 108 A party who has expended time and
resources finding and preparing the expert seeks to prevent such expenditures
from benefitting only opposing counsel, especially since the disclosure of
the expert's opinion would be severely damaging to the retaining party.
There is also the fear that if an adversary calls the expert at trial, discloses
that he used that expert to prepare for trial, or refers to the fact that his
opponent consulted the same expert in preparation for trial, the jury will
give that expert's testimony too much weight and thus compound the
prejudice to the party originally retaining the expert. 1' 9
It would seem that a retaining party would therefore do everything in his
power to protect his expert from being useful to his opponent in any way.
The parties retaining the experts, however, have not always protected their
experts from an adversary's inquiries. The primary justification offered for
waiving the exceptional circumstances requirement as a means of protecting
a retained expert and his opinions from use by an adversary was the
retaining attorney's tactical decision to allow such discovery to further his
client's position." 0 In addition, parties have permitted discovery based on
informal stipulations or other agreements to obtain some advantage in the
litigation, thus substantially deviating from the specific limitations on dis-
covery of non-testifying experts established by Rule 26(b)(4)(B)."'
108. See Graham, supra note 94, at 194.
109. See id. at 194-96. Graham suggests that the court require counsel and the expert to
refrain from mentioning the prior contact between the expert and the party originally consulting
the expert. Id.
110. See Day, supra note 94, at 54. Day suggests that an attorney may wish to provide his
adversary with a non-testifying expert's report or opinions in order to secure an early settlement
of the case. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 396. A retaining party may also recognize
the inevitability of disclosure of some materials and participate in early or cooperative disclosure
to save time and money. In addition, the client's position might be improved by early disclosure
since the retaining party would be complying with the requirements of the Rule and allowing
the expert to sophisticate his opinions without further harrassment from the adversary before
trial.
There is also the possibility that the retaining attorney may be willing to forego the
considerable time and expense that would be involved in litigating the question of whether
exceptional circumstances are present. Because the law is in transition, and thus uncertain on
the issue of the burden of proof in exceptional circumstances claims, see supra notes 63-68
and accompanying text, the retaining party may make a determination that the tactical "cost"
of disclosing the information is substantially lower than the cost of litigating the issue in terms
of delay, expense and inconvenience.
111. See Day, supra note 94, at 54. Day reported that where the exceptional circumstances
requirement was imposed, the two significant factual situations satisfying the test were a
change in circumstances precluding the adversary's expert from analyzing the item in question
and where a party's expert did not properly understand the purpose of discovery though the
item still existed. Id.
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4. The Rule's ambiguity regarding discovery of the identities of
non-testifying experts has resulted in divergent decisions.
Neither Rule 26(b)(4) nor the accompanying Advisory Committee Notes
establishes a clear method of discovering the identity of a non-testifying
expert, 112 and this uncertainty has led courts to adopt one of three ap-
proaches to determine the appropriate standard for such discovery. The
approach followed by a majority of courts concludes that the standard of
relevance established by Rule 26(b)(1)"3 is the "proper showing" contem-
plated by the Advisory Commitee for the disclosure of the identity of the
non-testifying expert. 1 4 The minority approach construes "proper showing"
to require the discovering party to demonstrate exceptional circumstances
to the court before the expert's identity may be revealed." 5 Finally, one
court has classified identity as a fact or opinion requiring a showing of
exceptional circumstances based on a strict reading of the provisions of the
text of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) rather than an interpretation of the phrase "proper
showing.' '116
The majority approach is illustrated by the decision in Baki v. B.F.
Diamond Construction Company.17 The Baki court's analysis of the dis-
coverabiity of the non-testifying expert's identity is a broad reading of Rule
26(b)(1) which permits a party to obtain information about the identity of
anyone having knowledge of discoverable facts. The court applied this
interpretation of 26(b)(1) to non-testifying experts because such experts may
have knowledge of discoverable or potentially discoverable information
under 26(b)(4)(B) and treated the absence of the word "identity"in 26(b)(4)(B)
112. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
113. Rule 26(b)(1) reads in pertinent part:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwisi limited by order of the court
in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discov-
erable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
114. See, e.g., Baki, 71 F.R.D. at 181-82; see also, e.g., Martin v. Easton Publishing Co.,
85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
115. See Ager, 622 F.2d 496; see also Kuster v. Harner, 109 F.R.D. 372, 375 (D. Minn.
1986); In re Sinking of Barge "'Ranger I, " 92 F.R.D. at 488-89.
116. See Ager, 622 F.2d at 503; Note, Discovery of the Nonwitness Expert Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), 67 IowA L. Ray. 349, 361 (1982).
117. 71 F.R.D. 179.
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as an indication that the authority of Rule 26(b)(1) governed the discovery
of the identity of the non-testifying expert.118 The Baki court also relied on
the holding in Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Company,11 9 in
which the court separated the identity of the non-testifying expert from the
expert's facts and opinions protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and allowed
discovery of the identity of the expert.12 The Baki court thus ordered the
retaining party to disclose the names, addresses, and other identifying
information of non-testifying experts that had been retained or specially
employed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial to the discov-
ering party.1 2 1
The minority position is expressed in Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital
and Training School for Nurses,122 which, ironically, is one of the few
appellate court decisions on the issue to date. The Ager court focused on
the Advisory Committee's concern over the unfairness of allowing an
opponent to prepare his case from information obtained through the dis-
covery of an adversary's expert and consequently held that the "proper
showing" required to compel discovery of the identity of the non-testifying
expert was the exceptional circumstances standard of 26(b)(4)(B).'2 The
Ager court identified four significant policy considerations in reaching its
decision. The first concern was that the revelation of the expert's identity
would result in the loss of the non-discoverable status of the expert's
opinions or records provided by the Rule. Second, the court feared that an
adversary might compel the retained party's non-testifying expert to testify
at trial.124 The court's third reason for denying disclosure except under
exceptional circumstances was concern about the prejudice that could arise
from an adversary revealing to the jury the fact that his opponent retained
an expert who would not be called at trial in order to impress upon the
jury that the opponent was supressing adverse evidence.'2 Finally, the court
recognized that the disclosure of the identities of experts could result in a
chilling effect on the willingness of experts to consult with attorneys re-
garding potential litigation. 126 The court concluded that the discovering party
118. Id. at 181-82.
119. 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
120. Id. at 114. The court stated that the revelation of the identity of the non-testifying
expert was not subject to protection under the work product doctrine and suggested the use
of a protective order to prevent the disclosure of the information where a valid reason for its
nondisclosure was present. Id.
121. Baki, 71 F.R.D. at 182.
122. 622 F.2d 496.
123. Id. at 502-03.
124. Id. at 503.
125. Id.
126. Id. While the Ager court restricted its discussion of the chilling effect on expert
witnesses to medical consultative experts, a commentator has suggested that the alleged chilling
effect has more widespread application. See Note, supra note 12, at 222-23.
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would carry a "heavy burden" in demonstrating the existence of exceptional
circumstances for the discovery of the non-testifying expert's identity. 2 7
Both of the above approaches have been the subject of criticism by
commentators. The Baki approach is attacked on the grounds that omitting
mention of the discovery of a non-testifying expert's identity does not
indicate that the provisions of Rule 26(b)(1) should apply but supports the
minority position that such identities are not discoverable. 2 The commen-
tator contends that Rule 26(b)(4) establishes a general bar of discovery of
the expert's facts and opinions and carves out limited exceptions based on
the expert's role in the trial, and since the drafters of the Rule expressly
mandated the disclosure of testifying experts only, it follows that the identity
of non-testifying experts could not be discovered freely. 129
The Ager approach has been criticized on the basis that the policy
considerations identified by the court do not justify imposition of exceptional
circumstances in light of other available means of protecting the expert. 130
First, the court's concern that the disclosure of the expert's identity would
result in wholesale subversion of the protections of the Rule regarding facts
and opinions is not realistic since most attorneys are reluctant to contact
an adversary's expert without the knowledge or consent of retaining coun-
sel.' Second, a retaining party can protect an expert by seeking a protective
order under Rule 26(c) 32 and thus prevent any future improprieties arising
from the disclosure of the expert's identity, and, in relation to factual data,
the name of the expert has little evidentiary value. 33 Third, a commentator
127. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503 (citing Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1142 n.13).
128. See Note, supra note 82, at 517.
129. Id.
130. See Note, supra note 116, at 363.
131. Id.
132. Rule 26(c) reads in pertinent part:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time and place; (3) that the
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that
the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be
conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that
a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commerial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed enve-
lopes to be opened as directed by the court.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
133. See Note, supra note 116, at 365, 369.
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suggests that an adversary will rarely wish to call an opponent's expert since
many experts have become "client-oriented" and would be unable or
unwilling to testify for the opponent."' Finally, it has been suggested that
the chilling effect on consultative experts would not be as substantial if the
Ager decision were properly limited to medical consultants. 35
Once again, it is also important to note that the dispute over the standard
of exceptional circumstances for disclosing the identity of the non-testifying
expert is given httle consideration in practice. Survey results have reported
that approximately 5001o of the responding attorneys require a showing of
mere relevance to obtain the non-testifying expert's identity, and such
discovery is allowed on the basis that the disclosure of the expert's identity
is not nearly as disadvantageous to the retaining party as disclosure of the
expert's facts and opinions. There is also the consideration that the client
might gain an important benefit if this request is granted. 3 6 Finally, the
judges surveyed reported that nearly one half would require only a showing
of relevance, and, despite the Ager ruling, only one judge in fifteen would
impose the exceptional circumstances upon a party seeking the identity of
an adversary's non-testifying expert. 3 7 An exceptional circumstances require-
ment for the discovery of a non-testifying expert's identity is clearly more
trouble than it is worth.
5. The standard employed to determine whether an expert is
formally or informally consulted is difficult to apply.
The absence of provisions in Rule 26(b)(4) for discovery of informally
consulted experts serves as a clear prohibition of discovery of such experts.' 38
Neither the text of the Rule nor the Advisory Notes provide any guidance
in differentiating retained from informally consulted experts, however, and
difficulties have arisen regarding the definition of the terms "retained" or
"specially employed" for the purpose of determining when an expert has
been retained or merely informally consulted. Prior to the Ager decision,
two definitions were used to distinguish retained from informally consulted
experts. The first, referred to as the "beneficial-assistance" approach,
focused on the argument that an expert has not been retained or specially
employed if the consulting party believes the expert's opinion would not
benefit his case. 3 9 A party may decide, for example, that a consulted expert
is not of assistance based on his insufficient credentials, unattractive de-
134. Id. at 369, 371.
135. Id. at 370.
136. See Day, supra note 94, at 55.
137. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 397, 412.
138. See Advisory Notes, supra note 3, at 504.
139. See Note, supra note 116, at 353.
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meanor, or excessive fees and thus not retain him for further assistance in
preparing for trial.14° The second definition, known as the "consideration-
tendered" approach, identified payment in exchange for the expert's services
as the determinative factor in concluding whether or not the expert was
retained or specially employed under the Rule.' 41
The Ager court rejected both the beneficial-assistance and consideration-
tendered definitions and created a multifactor analysis for determining the
status of the expert as a retained or informally consulted expert. 42 The
court held that the status of each expert must be determined ad hoc and
outlined the following factors for analysis:
(1) the manner in which the consultation was initiated;
(2) the nature, type, and extent of information or material provided
to, or determined by, the expert in connection with his review;
(3) the duration and intensity of the consultative relationship;
(4) the terms of the consultation if any (e.g. payment, confidentiality
of test data or opinions, etc.).143
The court justified the application of this multifactor analysis by noting
that circumstances existed where, under the beneficial-assistance definition,
a consulting party could retain an expert regardless of his assistance to that
party and, under the consideration-tendered definition, the requisite payment
to the expert could occur yet the consultation remain informal.'4
The Ager decision intended to establish a consistent method of distin-
guishing retained from informally consulted experts, but the court instead
perpetuated the difficulties in making the distinction. The court failed to
define the phrase "duration and intensity of the consultative relationship,"
and the court similarly neglected to discuss whether each of the identified
factors should be given equal weight or whether some factors were more
determinative than others. 14s The uncertainty of the decision thus might
have a chilling effect of its own by discouraging attorneys and experts from
discussing cases with each other for fear that the expert might later be
determined to be classified as a retained expert and subject to discovery./46
This case-by-case approach creates a situation more analogous to a guessing
game than a workable federal discovery procedure.
140. See Graham, supra note 2, at 939 n.182.
141. See Note, supra note 116, at 353.
142. Ager, 622 F.2d at 501.
143. Id.; see also Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493 (D. Colo. 1984); Comment, Healy v.
Counts: Discovering Informally Consulted Experts Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(B), 33 S.D.L. REv. 340, 342-46 (1988).
144. Ager, 622 F.2d at 502. But see USM Corp. v. American Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420
(6th Cir. 1980) (the court did not expressly use a multifactor analysis to determine the expert's
status and did not consider the factors of duration, intensity, or manner of initial consultation
in defining retained or specially employed).
145. See Note, supra note 116, at 357-58.
146. Id. at 358-59.
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6. The divergence in the interpretation and application of Rule
26(b)(4) has led to unfair results in the context of ex parte
contacts.
The discovery of expert witnesses is restricted to the procedures specified
in Rule 26(b)(4), and discovering parties are generally prohibited from
engaging in ex parte contact with an adversary's expert as a means of
discovery. Ex parte contacts are dangerous due to the inherent unfairness
of allowing an opponent to discuss the case with the retained expert outside
the presence of the retaining party's attorney, thus allowing the opponent
to gain knowledge of the case at the expense and to the detriment of the
retaining party. As noted above,' 47 federal trial courts have considerable
discretion in regulating discovery, and this discretion extends to attempts tb
remedy the alleged harm caused by ex parte contacts. However, recent cases
have pointed out that the divergent interpretations and applications of the
Rule can work an injustice on the discovering party, and in such situations,
a court has little opportunity to mitigate the damage.
The first case to deal specifically with the ex parte problem was Campbell
Industries v. M/V GEMINI, 1 48 which involved a dispute over the warranty
coverage of repairs on a tuna boat manufactured and sold by plaintiff
Campbell Industries (Campbell) and owned by defendant Gemini Enterprises
(Gemini). Campbell retained Nathaniel Torbert (Torbert) in July of 1974 to
inspect the M/V GEMINI, and on the basis of Torbert's report, decided
to call him as an expert witness at trial. 149 In February of 1977, Gemini's
affidavit in support of a motion to allow Torbert's deposition revealed that
while Torbert was still retained by Campbell, Gemini's counsel had made
several ex parte contacts with Torbert and that Torbert had expressed a
desire to testify for Gemini. 50 The district court denied Gemini's motion to
depose Torbert and sanctioned Gemini's "flagrant violation" of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)'s requirement of court approval for further discovery by pre-
cluding Gemini from using any of Torbert's testimony at trial.' The Ninth
Circuit upheld the ruling, citing the broad discretion of the district court
147. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
148. 619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980).
149. Id. at 26. The boat involved was a 1500-ton tuna purse seiner which required repair.
Gemini took the boat to Campbell in 1972 and 1973 for the necessary repairs under the
warranty agreement, and Campbell made all warranty repairs but also charged Gemini for
non-warranty repairs to the boat. Campbell sued in November of 1973 when Gemini refused
to pay for the non-warranty repairs, and Gemini counterclaimed alleging defective construction.
The issue involving expert testimony was the difference in the value of the boat as represented
by Campbell and the value as actually constructed. In the pre-trial discovery order of April,
1976, Campbell listed Torbert as a testifying expert and Gemini listed him as a non-expert
fact witness. Id. at 25-26.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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to remedy discovery abuses and noting that the district court properly denied
Gemini the fruits of its misconduct without prejudicing Gemini's case.12
This result is fair at first blush, since the Rule clearly requires the
discovering party to seek court approval before proceeding beyond the
interrogatory stage in the questioning of a testifying expert. However, in
light of the inability of courts to determine the proper standard for further
discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and the disregard for the Rule's two-step
procedure in actual practice, 5 3 the decision punished Gemini for actions
that may have been, in practice, acceptable for the discovery of the trial
expert. While the court may have been aware of such a practice in the
jurisdiction, the court was constrained to apply the Rule as written. 5 4
A second case, American Protection Insurance Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-
Las Vegas,5 5 involved the attempts of an unscrupulous expert witness to
instigate a bidding war between the retaining party and an opponent for
the expert's services at trial. 56 The litigation concerned allegations by
American Protection Insurance Co. (AMPICO) that the MGM Grand Hotel-
Las Vegas (MGM) inflated claims from a fire in 1981 in order to defray
the expenses of building a new addition to the hotel. 5 7 George Morris was
the MGM vice-president responsible for preparing the claim and supervising
the reconstruction of the hotel and was identified by MGM as its sole
testifying trial expert in response to AMPICO's interrogatories.5 Morris
tired of working with MGM and sought to enter a $1,000,000 personal
service contract with AMPICO to assist in the litigation by having his
personal attorney elicit the participation of Steve Cozen, lead counsel for
AMPICO. 5 9 After Cozen learned through negotiations that Morris was a
key member of MGM's trial "team," Cozen researched the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 26(b)(4) and concluded that Morris
was merely a fact witness not subject to the protections of the Rule and
obtained information from Morris regarding the validity of the fire claims.' 60
Once these contacts between Morris and Cozen were revealed, counsel
for MGM immediately moved the court to disqualify Cozen from the case
for violations of Rule 26(b)(4) and the Code of Professional Responsibility.16'
The court disqualified Cozen and his firm from representing AMPICO in
the litigation based on violations of the Rule and noted that despite Cozen's
152. Id. at 26-27.
153. See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
154. See Eliasen v. Hamilton, 111 F.R.D. 396, 401-02 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
155. No. CIV-LV-82-26 HEC (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983).
156. See Note, supra note 12, at 215.
157. Id.
158. No. CIV-LV-82-26 HEC (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Note, supra note 12, at 217.
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well intentioned inquiry into Morris' status as an expert, the issue was one
for the court to decide.1 62 The court resisted imposing further sanction on
Cozen, recognizing the absence of willful, dishonest or corrupt action by
Cozen and stated that disqualification from the case was a most heavy
penalty for what the court considered "merely an error of judgment.' 63
Regardless of the court's apparent leniency, the harm done to Cozen and
AMPICO by Cozen's disqualification in this case was irreparable. The
litigation involved over $40 million in disputed claims, and the disqualifi-
cation order deprived Cozen and his firm of what would have amounted
to millions of dollars in fees, stripped AMPICO of its selected and prepared
trial counsel, cost AMPICO thousands of dollars in appealing the disqual-
ification order, and substantially delayed the trial.64 The unfairness of this
result is compounded by the fact that the disqualification order was not
immediately appealable, and Cozen and AMPICO were prevented from
challenging the order until the conclusion of the trial on the merits. 16 This
result is telling of the problems created by the divergence of the interpre-
tation and application of 26(b)(4), as Cozen thoroughly inquired into the
Rule and was unable to obtain sufficient guidance to ascertain the acceptable
limits of contact with the testifying trial witness. The rule's failure to
provide such guidance imperiled the discovering party, and the rule as
written prevented the court from remedying the harsh result without fear
of reversal on appeal.
Two other cases warrant consideration in exposing the deficiencies of the
rule regarding ex parte contacts. In Durflinger v. Artiles,166 the plaintiffs in
a wrongful death action had retained an expert as a consultant and decided
not to use him as a testifying expert at trial.167 The defendants sought to
obtain a copy of the expert's reports and to call the expert at trial, but the
court considered this a circumvention of the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
requiring the demonstration of exceptional circumstances and upheld the
trial court's ruling prohibiting the defendants from using the expert's
testimony or information at trial.168 The court did note that under different
circumstances the trial judge might not have been required to exclude the
testimony of the expert consulted in violation of the discovery rules' 69 but
162. Id.
163. No. CIV-LV-82-26 HEC (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 1983). The court similarly prohibited Morris
from participating further in the litigation, noting that Morris purposely created a bidding war
between the litigants for his invaluable knowledge and was willing to "sell his soul for the
highest price." Id.
164. See Note, supra note 12, at 226 n.130.
165. Id. at 217 n.80.
166. 727 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1984).
167. Id. at 891.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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failed to mention what those circumstances might be. The result of these
varied practices regarding the exceptional circumstances requirement1 70 and
the failure of the court in this case to provide guidance for the future is
that a discovering party is reduced virtually to flipping a coin to determine
whether the court or fellow practitioners in his jurisdiction will take a
liberal or conservative approach to the exceptional circumstances require-
ment in conducting discovery.
The second case, Steele v. Seglie,17' involved a medical malpractice action
in which the plaintiff contacted and retained three doctors in preparation
for litigation against defendants Dr. Seglie and Mount Carmel Hospital and
decided not to retain the doctors based on their adverse opinions of the
merits of the case. Copies of the doctors' reports were inadvertently sent
to the defendants, who then sought to retain the doctors without knowledge
that the doctors had been retained by the plaintiff. 72 The doctors agreed
to testify for the defendants. Defendants sought a motion to depose the
experts, and, despite the fact the experts were by definition retained non-
testifying experts, the court granted the motion based on the plaintiff's
failure to object to the motion.7 3 The only restriction the court imposed
on the defendants was that counsel and the experts refrain from mentioning
the fact that the experts had been previously retained by the plaintiff to
prevent the inference that the plaintiff was hiding adverse testimony from
the jury. 174
Based upon the Ager ruling and the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(B),
the court should not have allowed the disclosure of the identity or the
substance of the testimony of the plaintiff's retained non-testifying experts. 7 5
Here, the inconsistency of approaches to the discovery of expert witnesses
in practice and in federal trial and appellate courts allowed experts normally
protected from an adversary to be quickly and easily converted to the cause
of that adversary.
7. The present structure of Rule 26(b)(4) may permit a consulting
party to deprive an adversary of access to experts
The dangers of a practice which may be referred to as "shielding" reveal
that the current interpretation of the Rule may, ironically, subvert the
170. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
171. Civ. No. 84-2200 (D. Kan. March 27, 1986).
172. Id.
173. Id. The apparent reason for the failure by plaintiffs counsel to object was that he
was unsure what procedure was proper or improper under the Rule. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
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unfairness principles the Rule was designed to remedy. 176 The problems
created by shielding point out the unintended effects of the current structure
and application of the Rule and thus warrant consideration in an analysis
of the "fairness" of the current interpretations of Rule 26(b)(4). First, an
interpretion of the Rule which prevents the discovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts prior to the date on which they were retained by
a party would encourage parties to hire experts and refrain from using them
at trial solely to keep the experts out of the reach of the opponent. 77 This
would allow a party to shield from the opposition several experts with
desirable testimonial traits and to narrow the field of qualified experts
available to the opposition. 171
Shielding concerns are also present in the context of requiring the dis-
covering party to show exceptional circumstances before discovering facts
and opinions of an adversary's retained expert. One commentator has stated
that because of the stringent requirements of the discovery of non-testifying
experts, the first party to find and "buy" an expert would be able to
suppress unfavorable facts or opinions by simply refusing to call the expert
at trial. 1' 9 Another disturbing aspect of the exceptional circumstances re-
quirement's protection of non-testifying experts is that a retaining party
may conceal information which, if disclosed, would demonstrate the factual
inadequacy of the retaining party's claim. 80 Finally, the Ager approach
176. Another commentator defines the practice of retaining or specially employing an expert
for the purpose of preventing his testimony as "sheltering." Comment, Gimme Shelter? Not
If You Are a Non-Witness Expert Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 56 U. CwN. L. REv. 1027, 1030
(1988). The commentator identifies three elements of sheltering: retention, bad faith, and
prevention of testimony. Id. The retention element is a given, for an expert must be retained
or employed for 26(b)(4)(B) to apply at all. The bad faith element can be analyzed and
remedied through the provisions of Rules 26(g) and 37 and the applicable sections of the
MODEL RULEs OF PRorSSIoNAL CONDUCT. Therefore, the discussion of this approach will be
limited to the prevention of testimony element.
177, See Eliasen, 111 F.R.D. at 403.
178. This was the issue in Green ex rel Green v. Maness, 69 N.C. App. 403, 316 S.E.2d
911 (1984), where the defendant in a medical malpractice action was held to have prevented
the plaintiff from obtaining medical testimony and obstructed plaintiff's trial preparation.
Comment, supra note 176, at 1031. The plaintiff's attorney consulted with a neonatologist
regarding the circumstances of the birth of plaintiff's child and obtained the expert's opinion
that the child suffered from oxygen deprivation during delivery. Green, 69 N.C. App. at 404,
316 S.E.2d at 913. Plaintiff's attorney, however, failed to retain the neonatologist as well as
another expert referred to plaintiff's attorney by the neonatologist and with whom plaintiff's
attorney reviewed the case; both experts were then retained by the defendant. Id. at 408, 316
S.E.2d at 914. The defendant then denied deposition requests and prohibited any discovery of
the experts. The appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that the defendant retained
the experts with an intent to deprive the plaintiff of the specially developed information and
compelled the discovery of the experts. 69 N.C. App. at 411-12, 316 S.E.2d at 914.
179. Note, Discovery of Expert Information, 47 N.C.L. REv. 401, 406 (1969).
180. In Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro Inc., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1587 (N.D. Ill.
1980), plaintiffs sought recovery from defendants in a patent infringement action after their
expert's testing of the defendant's product revealed the presence of one of the plaintiffs'
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requiring exceptional circumstances for the discovery of the identity of
experts contributes to this problem, since the inability of a discovering party
to obtain the name of the non-testifying expert would preclude the revelation
of other potentially discoverable information, regardless of whether such
information was disadvantageous to the retaining party. These practices
were apparently neither foreseen nor intended by the drafters of Rule
26(b)(4), and the Rule must be amended to reflect these developments.
The representative cases and empirical data demonstrate that the conflict-
ing interpretations and applications of Rule 26(b)(4) make discovery under
the Rule not merely confusing but dangerous. While intentional circumven-
tions of the discovery process should certainly not go unpunished, courts
are now sanctioning parties who conduct well intentioned but misguided
discovery, and the drafters' and courts' inability to provide such guidance
is the root of the problem. Innocent litigants seeking discovery of the facts
known and opinions held by expert witnesses are forced to walk blindfolded
through a minefield. This was clearly not the intention of the drafters in
creating a rule designed to prevent unfairness and to promote preparation
in the discovery process-Rule 26(b)(4) must be amended.
III. A PROPOSED AMENDIMENT OF RULE 26(B)(4).
A commentator suggests that the two primary justifications for proposing
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to improve the
operation of the Rule and to bring the Rule in line with cases and practices
in the federal courts.18" ' A critical analysis reveals that both justifications
are present for the amendment of Rule 26(b)(4). As noted in Part II of this
Note, the failure of the Rule to establish a clear and applicable procedure
for the discovery of expert witnesses has resulted in confusion in the courts,
rejection of the rule in practice, and unfair results in a variety of contexts.
The lack of an accessible appeal process has prevented the resolution of
patented chemicals; later tests by this same expert, before litigation, proved to the contrary.
See Comment, supra note 60, at 315. Plaintiffs concealed this adverse information by
designating the expert as non-testimonial to prevent disclosure of the meridtlessness of their
claim. The court stated that "facts which raise the suspicion that plaintiff may be proceeding
with litigation without adequate basis in fact to maintain it are exceptional circumstances
within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)," and held that a non-testifying expert in exclusive
possession of facts comprising the basis of the suit loses the protection of the Rule when such
protection deprives an opponent the opportunity to determine the factual basis of the claim.
Loctite, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1597; see also Barkwell v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. 79 F.R.D.
444 (D. Alaska 1978); Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 489 (D. Mont. 1978).
Fortunately, the Loctite court saw through the plaintiffs' scheme and prevented the abuse of
Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s protections; however, there is a very real possibility that many such cases
have gone undetected.
181. See Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-Toward a New Methodology of Deci-
sionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 894, 895, 904-05, 935 (1980).
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many of the problems discussed in this Note, and federal courts have been
precluded from implementing changes in the operation of the rule. As stated
by the court in Eliasen v. Hamilton:a2 "[Rule 26(b)(4)] is undoubtedly a
harsh rule. It may be a bad rule. We could join in the voices already
criticizing it as a bad rule. But this would not help defendants, because
good or bad, it is the rule, and we must apply it as written." '83 The rule
cries out for amendment.184
Several commentators have proposed amendments to the rule. Professor
Graham's attempt falls in several respects to remedy the problems presented
by the current rule."'5 Graham's proposed amendment properly disposes cf
the two-step procedure of 26(b)(4)(A) that has been rejected in practice but
ignores the need to provide for the discovery of the identity of non-testifying
experts without a showing of exceptional circumstances. The proposed
amendment also suffers by simply reiterating the language of 26(b)(4)(B)
regarding the definition of exceptional circumstances without indicating how
the requirement of impracticability can be met.
There are significant flaws in the proposal offered by another com-
mentator. 186 While the proposed amendment is to be applauded for incor-
182. 111 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
183. Id. at 401-02 (citations omitted).
184. See United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 371 (D.C. Mich. 1971)
("The 1970 amendment may resolve much of the disagreement on [the subject of expert
discovery], but even this advance is objected to . . . as not going far enough."); Day &
Dixon, supra note 39, at 397; Graham, supra note 93, at 200; Note, supra note 12, at 228.
185. Graham proposed the Rule be amended to read:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Subject to the provision of Rule 35(b), discovery
of facts and data known and opinions held by experts, and the grounds for each
opinion, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained only as follows:
(A) A party may discover from a person whom any other party expects to call
as an expert witness at trial, and from the other party, facts and data known
and opinions held by the expert witness together with the grounds of each
opinion. Furthermore, if such expert witness relies in forming his opinion, in
whole or in part, upon facts, data, or opinions contained in a document or made
known to him by or through another person, a party may also discover with
respect thereto.
(B) A party may discover facts, data, opinions, and grounds thereof held by
an expert who has been retained, specially employed, or consulted either formally
or informally, by another party or by, or for, the other party's representative
and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts, data, or opinions on the same subject by other means.
Graham, supra note 94, at 200. Graham left subdivision (C) of the Rule substantially
unchanged, reflecting only an elimination of the two-step procedure of subdivision (A) in
determining fee division under subdivision (A). The second sentence of subdivision (A) of the
above proposed amendment deals with the special problem of discovery of "second-tier"
experts which is outside the scope of analysis of this Note. For a thorough discussion, see id.
at 196-99.
186. That commentator suggests this provision be added to the current structure of Rule
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porating the mutuality considerations suggested by Professor Friedenthal
and Mr. Long, 8 7 it simply ignores the empirical data revealing the inade-
quacy of the interrogatory as a discovery device and fails to eliminate the
two-step procedure of 26(b)(4)(A).'88 The author does, however, appropri-
ately revise the Rule to allow for discovery of the identity of non-testifying
experts without a showing of exceptional circumstances and seeks to prevent
the dangers of ex parte contacts resulting from disclosure of such experts'
identities by explicitly prohibiting ex parte contacts. The requirement that
the parties update the identities of experts after the initial listing indirectly
amends the provisions of Rule 26(e)(1), which currently requires a party to
supplement a response to discovery requesting the identity of trial witnesses
only. 18
9
An amendment proposed by Professor Day reflects the inadequacy of the
interrogatory and consequently eliminates the two-step procedure in favor
of more wide-open discovery of the testifying expert. The proposal strikes
a proper balance between the necessity of trial preparation and unfairness
to a retaining party by favoring liberal discovery subject to restrictions only
where necessary to protect the retaining party or expert from prejudice as
determined by the court.' 9° Professor Day's only deficiency is in his failure
26(b'(4):
Timing of expert discovery. Before discovery is to commence, the court shall
require both parties to set forth in writing the identities of all experts they have
contacted in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, regardless of
whether these experts are to testify at trial or not, and shall require parties to
update that information as necessary. After the exchange of this information,
the parties may then, pursuant to section (b)(4)(A)(i) of this Rule, send interrog-
atories to those experts who qualify, and may petition the court for further
discovery under section (b)(4)(A)(ii). Contact by opposing counsel with an expert
qualifying under section (b)(4)(B) of this rule [sic] without the court's approval
is expressly prohibited, and is cause for sanctions under Rule 37.
Note, supra note 12, at 228. The reference to Rule 37 is to the court's ability to impose
sanctions upon parties or counsel violating the rules of discovery or orders of the court
pursuant to such rules.
187. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
188. Arguably, the amendment of the Rule regarding the two-step requirement of 26(b)(4)(A)
was outside the scope of that author's Note.
189. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(e)(1). The proposed requirement is arguably unnecessary based on
a broad reading of 26(e)(2) or may be ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties under
26(e)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e). In addition, under a broad reading of Baki v. B.F. Diamond
Const. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976), the non-testifying expert's identity would be treated
the same as any other person having knowledge of discoverable facts and thus fall under
26(e)(1)(A).
190. Day's proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(4)(A) reads:
(A) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial and whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial by any means otherwise permitted by these rules. Discovery of
such experts shall be subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this
rule concerning fees and expenses and to such restrictions regarding the scope of
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to apply his insight to the other problems presented by the current Rule by
suggesting further amendments. 19' Finally, the provisions of an experimental
change in the rules governing expert discovery in California' 92 also contribute
to the following amendment of the Rule.
A. The Proposed Amendment
In order to correct the current deficiencies of the Rule and establish an
improved procedure for the discovery of expert witnesses, Rule 26(b)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to read as follows:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Upon the setting of a trial date, any
party may make a demand for simultaneous discovery of the identities,
facts known, and opinions held by experts otherwise discoverable under
the provisions of subsection (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or trial only as follows:
(A) A party may discover the identity, facts known or opinions held by
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party
in antipipation of litigation or preparation for trial and whom the other
party expects to call as an expert witness at trial by any means otherwise
permitted by these rules. Discovery of such experts shall be subject to
the provisipns of subdivision (b)(4)(D) of this rule concerning fees and
expenses and to such restrictions regarding the scope of discovery which,
upon motion pursuant to subdivision (c) of this rule, the court may
order.
(B) 4 party mty discover facts known or opinions held by an expert
who has been retair ed or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected
to be called as a witness at trial only as provided in Rule 35(b), by
consent of the retainipg party, or upon a showing that (i) it is impossible
for the party seeking discovery to obtain or duplicate the expert's facts,
data, or opinions as a r~sult of a change in circumstances which deprives
the discovering party the opportunity to develop the requested facts,
data, or opinions; or (ii) the expense and/or delay of obtaining or
replicating the requested item, material, or information is socially or
judicially prohibitive.' A party may discover the name and other iden-
tifying information of an expert otherwise qualifying under this subsec-
tion upon a showing of relevance under subsection (b)(1) of this rule.
(C) The identity, facts known, or opinions held by an expert who has
been consulted by a party but not retained or specially employed by
discovery which, upon motion pursuant to subdivision (c) of this rule [governing
protective orders], the court may order.
Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 398; see also Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D.
301 (E,D. Pa. 1983); Comment, Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corporation: Further Discovery
of Testimonial Experts Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), 33 S.D.L. Rlv.
?31 (1988).
191. In recognition of Professor Day's achievement of proposing an amendment upon which
pq improyenpnts can be made, the proposed amendment of 26(b)(4)(A) is adopted in the
apinndmept pffered by this Note.
192. CkL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 2034(a), (c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
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that party shall not be dliscdVerable unless the discovering party dem-
onstrates that the expert's facts and opinions would be discoverable
under subsection (B)(i) &? (ii) of this rule were the expert retained.
(D) Unless manifest injii.tice would result, (i) the court shall require
that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time
spent in responding to discbvery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A) and (b)(4)(B)
of this rule; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision
(b)(4)(A) of this rule the court may require, and with respect to subdi-
visions (b)(4)(B) and (C) of this rule the court shall require, the party
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and
opinions from the expert.
B. Effect of the Proposed Amendment of Rule 26(b)(4)
The first effect of the proposed amendment of the Rule is the textual
incorporation of the principles of mutuality suggested by Friedenthal and
Long but ignored by the advisory committee in drafting Rule 26(b)(4) in
1970.9 The advisory committee overestimated the potential benefit of
discovering an adversary's expert and the tendency of attorneys to rely on
discovery to prepare the case-in-chief, failing to recognize that experts will
often simply disagree at trial and thus not be helpful to the discovering
party at all.' 94 The advisory committee's concern over the unfairness of
allowing a discovering party to build his case from the discovery of an
adversary's expert, while well intentioned, is no longer a justification for
placing such stringent restrictions on the discovery of experts. 95
A policy of full discovery should be implemented instead, and the
mutuality principle of the proposed amendment will accomplish this goal
by providing each party an opportunity to prepare adequately for the cross-
examination of experts and eliminate the unfairness of the present discovery
process by requiring a party to prepare his own case before discovery of
an adversary's expert. The express requirement of mutuality would reflect
the approach taken in practice,' 96 and would also serve to protect against
the danger that a party will manufacture adverse expert testimony after the
discovery of his adversary's expert. Finally, the fear that a party will be
inextricably bound by the initial listing of experts under this provision and
precluded from retaining and using a newly found expert's testimony is
eliminated if the retaining party supplements his discovery responses in
compliance with Rule 26(e)(1).197
193. See supra notes 29-31 & 43 and accompanying text.
194. See Graham, supra note 94, at 190-91.
195. See id.
196. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 392; see also CAL. CGv. PROC. CODE § 2034(a),
(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
197. See generally Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 457 (2d Cir. 1975);
Tabachnik v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D. N.J. 1975).
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Absent from the proposed amendment are the timing considerations
suggested by Friedenthal and Long. 198 The empirical data reveal that retain-
ing counsel do not consistently require an adversary to determine the experts
the adversary expects to call at trial before allowing the adversary to conduct
discovery of the retained expert. A timing requirement is not enforced by
litigants because there may be an incentive to allow such prior discovery to
achieve an early settlement of the case. 199 Because the mutuality provision
in the amended rule requires initial mutual disclosure subject to the tactical
decisions of retaining counsel, the timing considerations advocated by Frien-
denthal and Long would add nothing to the operation of the rule and are
therefore rejected in the proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would eliminate the two-step procedure for the
discovery of testifying experts under 26(b)(4)(A) and allow a discovering
party to obtain information about the testifying expert through any other
means allowed under 26(b)(1). This revision recognizes the inadequacy of
the interrogatory as a discovery device and resolves the dilemma of deter-
mining a standard for permitting further discovery under 26(b)(4)(A) by
doing away with the two-step procedure of the current rule. This provision,
as amended, would ensure that discovering parties have adequate preparation
for cross-examination and trial and reduces the possibility of unfairness to
the retaining party by requiring the discovering party to compensate the
retaining party and expert for fees and expenses reasonably incurred in
responding to the discovery request under 26(b)(4)(D). The amended version
of 26(b)(4)(A) would bring the rule in line with practice and thus give
practitioners the guidance needed to plan discovery strategies and to develop
a concept of the case based on what information may be obtained under
this provision. Finally, the amended provision would permit the retaining
party to restrict the scope of discovery through motion to the court under
Rule 26(C).
The exceptional circumstances requirement of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) has been
revised to resolve the divergence of interpretations regarding what constitutes
a showing of exceptional circumstances by incorporating the two primary
approaches from case law. The changed circumstances and prohibitive cost
approaches have been "codified" in the proposed amendment to establish
the standard for discovery of the facts known or opinions held by the non-
testifying expert.
This revision would reduce the confusion surrounding the discovery of
non-testifying experts by giving discovering parties an articulated standard
that must be satisfied. The proposed amendment would continue to impose
the modified exceptional circumstances requirement on discovering parties
198. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
199. See Day & Dixon, supra note 39, at 392-93.
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since discovery of the facts and opinions of the non-testifying expert is
virtually the exclusive province in which unfairness to the retaining party
will occur. The revised provision recognizes, however, that the exceptional
circumstances requirement is often not enforced by retaining parties in
practice, and thus allows the retaining party to disclose such information
by agreement with the adversary if such disclosure would secure an advan-
tage for his client.
The proposed amendment resolves the conflict in the courts concerning
the proper showing for discovery of the identity of a non-testifying expert
by adopting the Baki approach requiring only a showing of relevance to
discover the identities of such experts. Obtaining the name of the expert
would give the discovering party a starting point for determining what
discoverable material may exist and would assist the discovering party in
making the showing of impracticability as established in revised Rule
26(b)(4)(B). 2-0 This revision would reveal information to the discovering
party that would otherwise remain hidden and is therefore consistent with
the policy of allowing full discovery before trial. The revision would prevent
the retaining party from shielding experts from an adversary by merely
consulting the experts and not calling the experts at trial, and the disclosure
of the identities of the experts that have been consulted by the retaining
party would eliminate many of the dangers associated with ex parte contacts
by explicitly notifying the discovering party that the experts have been
previously contacted by the retaining party.
Despite the required disclosure of the identities of non-testifying experts
under the revised Rule, a retaining party still has sufficient opportunity to
protect his expert from any alleged unfairness imposed by this requirement.
First, the fear that ex parte contacts are the inevitable result of the disclosure
of the non-expert's identity is no longer warranted in light of the seriousness
with which courts have viewed ex parte contacts in the cases that have
presented the issue.20 1 The revised Rule clarifies many of the current am-
biguities of the present Rule, and the limitations on acceptable discovery
practices would provide sufficient guidance for discovering parties. Few
discovering parties would be willing to spend time and money improperly
discovering expert witnesses since the discovering party may be precluded
from using the testimony at trial, may be disqualified from the case without
an opportunity to immediately appeal the order, and may be subject to
sanctions under Rule 37 for violating discovery orders.
A retaining party also may take one or more of several affirmative steps
to protect his expert. An obvious step is to seek a protective order from
the court to limit the scope of discovery or to prevent the disclosure of the
200. See Note, supra note 116, at 367.
201. See supra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
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non-testifying expert's identity if such disclosure is irrelevant, privileged, or
otherwise worthy of protection. 2°2 A retaining party may also have his expert
commit to an exclusivity agreement to prevent the expert from discussing
the subject matter of the litigation with anyone but the retaining party or
counsel, and retaining counsel could further govern the expert's disclosures
by employing the expert directly rather than through the client. In addition,
there are a myriad of techniques for structuring the development and
communication of information for testimony through deposition, trial tes-
timony, or production of documents that will reduce the danger of infor-
mation slipping into the wrong hands as the case is prepared for litigation.
For example, an attorney could control the expert's sources of information
by selecting the materials from which the expert will form his opinion,
discouraging the expert from preparing written reports, and refraining from
giving the expert the work product of retaining counsel. 2 3 The disclosure
of merely the identity of the non-testifying expert poses no threat to the
retaining party, and, even if the disclosure did cause a problem, the retaining
party has ample opportunity to prevent or remedy any harm.
The inclusion of an express provision governing the discovery of infor-
mally consulted experts is designed to remedy the confusion in the courts
over whether a complete ban of discovery of such experts is warranted
under the Rule. Despite the clear statement in the advisory committee notes
that neither the identity nor facts or opinions of the informally consulted
expert must be revealed, at least one court has allowed the disclosure of
the identity and information of such experts upon a showing of need.
204
The proposed amendment recognizes that an informally consulted expert
may become the only expert with knowledge of certain facts and thus makes
such an informally consulted expert subject to discovery upon a demon-
stration of need under the provisions of revised Rule 26(b)(4)(B)(i) or (ii).
The revision adopts the suggestions of Professor Graham by considering
any expert who satisfies the modified exceptional circumstances test a
retained expert who is subject to the discovery provisions of retained but
non-testifying experts. 20 5 If the amendment were adopted, a party would
not be discouraged from searching for expert witnesses for fear that the
consulted expert would be subject to routine discovery and would not allow
a consulting party to shield an expert of limited or no assistance from a
discovering party upon a demonstration of compliance with the provisions
of revised Rule 26(b)(4)(B)(i) or (ii). Finally, there is no unfairness to the
retaining party as a result of this disclosure since the consulting party
202. See Note, supra note 116, at 365.
203. See Daniels, supra note 1, at 64, 66-67; see also Connors, supra note 50, at 287-88;
Daniels, Protecting Your Expert During Discovery, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 50-54.
204. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
205. See Graham, supra note 2, at 940.
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invested little if any expense in consulting the ineffective expert. Rule
26(b)(4)(C) has been changed only in title and in the elimination of reference
to the two-step procedure of the current Rule.
The proposed amendment also recognizes the policy of discovery rules
favoring extrajudicial discovery practices by eliminating the two-step pro-
cedure of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and by simplifying the showing of exceptional
circumstances of Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Finally, the proposed amendment clarifies
several ambiguities of the present Rule and provides more practical guidance
for practitioners and judges required to interpret and apply the Rule. When
combined with the advantages of full discovery encouraged by the proposed
amendment, the revisions would reduce the areas of dispute at trial, promote
settlement, avoid suprise, and encourage parties to prepare for trial inde-
pendently. 206
CONCLUSION
The current interpretation and application of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(4) is inadequate to govern the discovery of expert witnesses.
The Rule's overwhelming concern with preventing unfairness to the retaining
party has imposed too many limitations on the discovering party and
prevented adequate preparation for cross-examination and trial. The. Rule
contains ambiguities that have resulted in divergent interpretations in the
federal court system and a rejection of the requirements of the Rule in
practice. The current structure and interpretation of the Rule force a
discovering party to pursue blindly information in the discovery of expert
witnesses while allowing a retaining party further to shield expert testimony
from discovery. The current provisions of the Rule also imperil even the
most innocent of discovering parties by clouding distinctions between experts
and fostering conflicting or nonexistent standards for discovery resulting in
sanctions against the discovering party for ex parte contacts with an adver-
sary's expert.
Rule 26(b)(4)'s inability to govern the discovery of expert witnesses
necessitates an amendment of the Rule. The amendment proposed in Part
III.A. suggests a policy of full disclosure to be implemented by requiring
mutuality of disclosure, eliminating the two-step process of 26(b)(4)(A),
clarifying the exceptional circumstances requirement of 26(b)(4)(B), and
permitting the discovery of the identity of non-testifying experts and the
discovery of informally consulted experts where absolutely necessary. The
proposed amendment strikes the balance between the competing policies of
adequate trial preparation and unfairness to the retaining party by favoring
preparation for trial and suggesting methods of reducing the possible un-
206. See Graham, supra note 94, at 191.
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fairness to the retaining party. In light of the positive effect the proposed
revisions would have upon the current operation of the Rule, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) should be so amended.
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